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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioner, Linda Acosta, files this Petition for Review from an order of 
the Utah Labor Commission, dated October 23, 2003. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-
801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Labor Commission correctly dismissed Ms. Acosta's 
occupational disease claim under the claim preclusion branch of the 
doctrine of res judicata where Ms. Acosta had previously litigated her claim 
and appealed all the way to the Utah Supreme Court? 
Standard: The Court of Appeals' determination of whether res judicata 
bars an action presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See 
Macris & Assoc, v. Newavs, 2000 UT 93, f 17, 16 P.3d 1214. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the requirements for the 
application of claim preclusion as follows: 
{19} The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct 
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim 
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and also the 
same cause of action, "'and this precludes the relitigation of all 
issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, 
in fact, litigated in the prior action."' . . . 
{20} In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of 
action, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 1H[19, 20, 16 P.3d 1214. The 
Court of Appeals recently issued decisions on this point as well. See Youren 
v. Tintic School Dist., 2004 UT App 33; and H.C. Massey v. Board of 
Trustees of the Ogden Area Community Action Committee, 2004 UT App 27. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 26, 1999, Ms. Acosta filed an Application for Hearing for an 
industrial injury claim she alleged occurred at Salt Lake Regional Hospital 
on December 20, 1998. In this application, she alleged that she was lifting 
a baby out of a crib and suffered a low back injury. This Application for 
Hearing, filed through her then counsel, Timothy Allen, claimed entitlement 
to recommended medical care and temporary total disability compensation 
(i.e., indemnity compensation). This litigation is known as Labor 
Commission case number 99301 (hereinafter "the first action"). See R. at 
85. 
A formal hearing on the first action was held on September 1, 1999 
before Administrative Law Judge Donald L. George (the "ALJ") at the Utah 
Labor Commission. 
On October 22, 1999, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, awarding workers' compensation benefits. 
The ALJ's award was based, at least in part, on a cumulative trauma 
theory. 
Respondents timely filed a Motion for Review with the Labor 
Commission on November 17, 1999. On January 31, 2000, the 
Commission issued its Order Granting Respondents' Motion for Review, 
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reversing the ALJ's award of workers' compensation benefits to Ms. Acosta. 
Ms. Acosta filed a Petition for Review of this Order with the Court of Appeals 
on February 29, 2000. The Court of Appeals ruled in Respondents' favor, 
holding that Ms. Acosta was not entitled to receive workers' compensation 
benefits from this episode since she had an asymptomatic preexisting 
condition and that such a condition required her to meet the higher legal 
causation standard of Allen v. Industrial Commission. See Acosta v. Labor 
Commission, 2002 UT App 67, 44 P.3d 819. The Utah Supreme Court 
denied her request for certiorari. See Acosta v. Labor Commission. 48 P.3d 
979 (Utah 2002). 
Thereafter, on August 27, 2002, through new legal counsel, Richard 
Burke, Ms. Acosta filed two additional Applications for Hearing with the 
Labor Commission. As with her First Application, Ms. Acosta again sought 
medical expenses and disability compensation from Respondents based 
upon the identical low back condition. In one application, Ms. Acosta 
alleged an industrial accident claim, attributing her low back pain to 
"cumulative work trauma" as a result of working on December 20, 1998. 
This case is known as Labor Commission Case No. 2002958. See R. at 2 
(the "cumulative trauma claim"). Ms. Acosta has voluntarily withdrawn this 
claim. In the other application, she alleged an "occupational disease claim* 
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for her back problems which she says occurred from approximately 
December 1980 to December 20, 1998 while working at Salt Lake Regional 
Hospital. See R. at 25 (the "occupational disease claim"). 
On October 1, 2002, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
cumulative trauma and occupational disease applications based upon the 
doctrine of res judicata and the applicable 180-day statute of limitation for 
giving notice to one's employer. See R. at 52. The Administrative Law 
Judge granted the Motion to Dismiss, entering her Order on Motion to 
Dismiss on April 18, 2003. See R. at 103. The ALJ agreed that these 
additional applications were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The ALJ 
did not address the notice argument, the issue of res judicata being 
determinative. 
On May 19, 2003, Ms. Acosta filed a Motion for Review of the Order. 
See R. at 110-23. Respondents filed a Reply to Motion for Review on or 
about June 9, 2003. See R. at 124-37. 
The Labor Commission entered its Order Denying Review on October 
23, 2003 (the "Commission's Order"). See R. at 139-43. Ms. Acosta 
subsequently filed a Petition for Review on November 11, 2003 and a timely 
Docketing Statement thereafter. See R. at 144-45. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not disputed. The relevant facts are as 
follows: 
Ms. Linda Acosta is a licensed practical nurse who has worked for 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center in its maternal infant division from 
December 1980 through December 20, 1998. See Acosta, 2002 UT App 67 
at f 2. On December 20, 1998, Ms. Acosta was assigned to take a rolling 
crib, which came to her breast bone, from the nursery to a patient's room. 
On arrival in the patient's room, Ms. Acosta reached down into the crib, 
picked up the eight-pound infant, turned, and handed the infant to its 
mother. As she performed this task, Ms. Acosta claims she felt a twinge in 
her back. Shortly thereafter, she went to lunch. After lunch, she claims 
that she had difficulty standing up and walking. Upon learning of this 
development, a supervisor sent her to the emergency room. Over time, Ms. 
Acosta's pain grew worse. She was diagnosed with significant degenerative 
changes in her spine, including severe spinal stenosis. She ultimately had 
spinal surgery performed at L4-5 by Dr. Robert Hood. 
Ms. Acosta subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim with 
Respondents seeking indemnity and medical benefits arising from this 
alleged industrial accident. Respondents denied Ms. Acosta's claim. She 
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then filed her claim with the Utah Labor Commission by way of an 
Application for Hearing. The Application for Hearing for her first action 
provides: 
The accident occurred as follows: I was lifting a baby out of 
an isolet (sic) to hand to its 
mother. 
The injuries I sustained are: LB pain w/ Ruptured L4-5 disk? 
Benefits claimed: Temporary total disability 
Recommended medical care 
See R. at 85. 
The ALJ correctly recognized that under Utah law there are two legal 
causation standards applicable to industrial injury claims: (1) a lower, more 
lenient standard applicable to injuries where a claimant does not have a 
preexisting condition; and, (2) a higher, more stringent standard applicable 
when a claimant has a preexisting condition. However, the ALJ concluded 
that the more stringent legal causation standard would not apply in this 
instance despite Ms. Acosta's admitted preexisting back condition. As such, 
the ALJ awarded Ms. Acosta workers' compensation benefits under section 
34A-2-401 of the Utah Code. The ALJ's ruling also indicated that benefits 
were awardable to Ms. Acosta under the higher legal causation standard 
based upon a cumulative trauma theory, although this theory was never 
raised by Ms. Acosta. 
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The Labor Commission subsequently reversed the ALJ's decision to 
award Ms. Acosta workers' compensation benefits. Like the ALJ, the 
Commission recognized the two possible legal causation standards 
articulated in Allen. However, the Commission concluded that the more 
stringent legal causation standard applied because Ms. Acosta had a 
preexisting back condition at the time of her injury. Ultimately, the 
Commission ruled that Ms. Acosta had not satisfied the higher legal 
causation standard and, therefore, denied Ms. Acosta workers' 
compensation benefits. The Commission also ruled that the ALJ erred in 
raising a sua sponte claim of cumulative trauma. This matter was appealed 
to the Utah Court of Appeals which issued a decision on March 7, 2002 
affirming the Labor Commission's ruling that the higher legal causation 
standard applied to asymptomatic pre-existing conditions and, therefore, 
ultimately found that a one-time lift did not meet the higher legal causation 
standard since it did not amount to an unusual or extraordinary exertion 
when compared with 20 th century non-employment life. See Acosta, 2002 
UT App 67. The Court of Appeals also agreed that the ALJ erred in sua 
sponte raising the cumulative t rauma claim. Ms. Acosta's Petition for 
Certiorari was denied. 
On August 27, 2002 Ms. Acosta filed two new Applications for Hearing 
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again seeking workers' compensation benefits based upon the same events 
alleged in her first action. This time, however, she raised different legal 
theories of relief. One of the applications recast the claim under a theory 
of repetitive injury from cumulative trauma, compensable under the 
Workers' Compensation Act, section 34A-2-101 et seq. The cumulative 
trauma claim provides: 
The accident occurred as follows: lifting babies, assisting patients 
with activities of daily living, 
picking up items from the floor 
and other activities 
The injuries I sustained are: 
Benefits claimed: 
low back 
medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total 
compensation, temporary partial 
compensation, permanent partial 
compensation, travel expenses, 
interest. 
See R. at 2. 
The other application recast the claim as an occupational disease 
claim based upon gradual injury, compensable under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, Section 34A-3-101 et seq. The occupational 
disease claim provides: 
The accident occurred as follows: lifting babies, assisting patients 
with activities of daily living, 
picking up items from the floor 
and other activities 
9 
The injuries I sustained are: low back 
Benefits claimed: medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total 
compensation, temporary partial 
compensation, permanent partial 
compensation, travel expenses, 
interest. 
See R. at 25. 
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the cumulative t rauma and 
occupational disease claims under the doctrines of res judicata and failure 
to comply with the applicable 180-day notice requirements of 34A-2-407 
and 34A-3-108 (1998). See R. at 52-64. The ALJ granted Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss. The cases were consolidated and were appealed from 
the ALJ to the Commission. 
The Commission evaluated whether these new applications were 
barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Commission entered its 
Order Denying Motion for Review on October 23, 2003, pointing out that the 
gravamen of the new claims was that Ms. Acosta injured her back over time 
as a result of work-related activities at Salt Lake Regional, which back 
injury first became acute on December 20, 1998, when she lifted an infant 
from its crib. See R. at 60-62. Ultimately, the Commission concluded that 
Ms. Acosta's subsequent filings were barred under this doctrine. Ms. 
Acosta's appeal takes issue with the Commission's evaluation of the res 
10 
judicata doctrine to her occupational disease claim under the facts 
presented here. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The primary issue in this case is whether the Commission erred in 
ruling that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim is barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Respondents agree with the Commission that the elements 
necessary to invoke this defense apply. The occupational disease claim 
involves the same parties. Moreover, the first action resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. Most significantly, the theories raised in the 
subsequent action, although not presented in the first action, involve the 
same claim, and constitute a claim that could have and should have been 
raised in the first action. This Court should affirm the evaluation and 
analysis of the Commission in this case. 
In the event that this Court finds the doctrine of res judicata 
inapplicable, the Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim is still barred by 
the notice provisions of section 34A-2-407 and 34A-3-108, U.C.A.. Under 
this circumstance, remand to the Commission would be the appropriate 
remedy. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BARS MS. ACOSTA'S 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM 
A. The Elements of Res Judicata Are Satisfied 
Ms. Acosta advances several challenges to the Commission's res 
judicata evaluation. Respondents submit that the Commission 
appropriately dismissed Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim under this 
legal doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has delineated the requirements for the 
application of claim preclusion as follows: 
{19} The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct 
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim 
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and also the 
same cause of action, "'and this precludes the relitigation of all 
issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, 
in fact, litigated in the prior action.m . . . 
{20} In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of 
action, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc.. 2000 UT 93, 1f|l9-20, 16 P.3d 1214. 
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The parties do not dispute that the first requirement of this doctrine 
(same parties) and the third element (final judgment on the merits) are 
satisfied. Indeed, both cases involve the same parties, and the first action 
resulted in a final judgment, following several appeals, on the merits. The 
issue in this case surrounds the second element of this doctrine, i.e., 
whether the claim presented in the subsequent action and adjudicated in 
the ensuing proceeding are the same claim presented in the first action 
and, even if it was not presented in the first action, whether it could have 
and should have been presented in the earlier proceeding. See State in the 
Interest of J. J.T.. 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
With regard to the first part of the second requirement, there is no 
question that the occupational disease claim was not "presented in the first 
suit." It was not alleged in the first action by Ms. Acosta. Rather, the legal 
issues to be decided are: (1) whether the occupational disease claim is the 
"same claim" as that raised in the first action; (2) whether the occupational 
disease claim is one that "could have been raised" in the first action; and, 
(3) whether the occupational disease claim is one that "should have been 
raised" in the first action. If each of these are answered in the affirmative, 
Ms. Acosta's additional claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
13 
1. The Former and Subsequent Action Raise the Same 
Claim, 
The "same claim" requirement has been addressed in numerous 
appellate court cases. Utah's Courts have stated that the claim, demand, 
or cause of action in the present suit must be identical to the one brought 
in the prior suit. See Maoris, 2000 UT 93, 119; Schaer v. State. 657 P.2d 
1337, 1340-41(Utah 1983). 
In defining the term "cause of action" the Utah Supreme Court has 
focused on the identity of facts and evidence. Moreover, Utah's Courts have 
held that claims that are based upon the same subject matter but different 
legal theories constitute the "same claim" for purposes of res judicata. For 
instance, in Macris, the Court defined "cause of action" as follows: 
In identifying whether claims are identical for res judicata 
purposes, this court has focused on whether "the two causes of 
action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a 
different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two 
causes of action." Therefore, even if a plaintiff is aware of the 
factual basis of a suit at the filing of another suit, he or she is 
not obligated to bring all claims together if there is no identity 
of facts and evidence between two claims. 
Macris at f27. 
Similarly, in Gossner v. Dairymen Assocs., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 1980) 
the Supreme Court stated: 
A precise definition of "cause of action" as it relates to res 
judicata has never been agreed on. With the abandonment of 
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strict common law pleading and the move to broader, permissive 
pleading rules, the scope of a given cause of action has been 
expanded in order to perpetuate the underlying purpose of the 
doctrine — to regard as resolved all matters which were or could 
have been raised. It is often said that both disputes must relate 
to the same subject matter, and draw on the same underlying 
factual questions and evidentiary foundation. Where the 
foregoing are present, it is generally regarded as inconsequential 
that the respective claims are different as to form or theory of 
recovery. 
Id, at 719. (J. Hall Dissenting) 
The Utah's Court of Appeals recently held that Utah law looks to "'the 
aggregate of operative facts, . . . the situation or state of facts which entitles 
a party to sustain an action' to determine whether two suits stem from the 
same cause of action." See Massey, 2004 UT App n.4. (citation omitted); 
American Estate Management v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp.. 1999 UT 
App 232, 1H[9-11, 986 P.2d 765. 
In American Estate, like the present action, the plaintiff originally 
claimed title based upon one legal theory ~ breach of contract. He later 
claimed title based upon another legal theory — adverse possession. The 
Court stated that these two actions raise the same claim, although under 
two different legal guises. See id. at ^ 11. 
Ms. Acosta's most recent occupational disease claim meets the same 
claim requirement. Like the first action, the present s claim relates to the 
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same subject matter or legal right — Ms. Acosta's entitlement to workers' 
compensation medical and disability benefits as a part of her work at Salt 
Lake Regional (i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-410 et seq.). Like the first 
action, the present claim entails the same injury to her low back and 
requests entitlement to the identical medical expenses for the same low 
back condition1. Although the occupational disease claim alleges exposure 
from December 1980 to December 20, 1998, this new theory alleges injury 
during the same basic period of employment —December 20, 1998.2 
1
 See Rogers v. Kunja Knitting Mills. U.S.A., 520 S.E.2d 815 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1999). In Rogers, the court focused on whether the claims 
alleged the same injury. Because they did not, res judicata was denied. 
2
 In his treatise, Freidenthal notes that, under the same evidence 
test, it is not necessary that the evidence be absolutely identical, but 
merely that a substantial part of the facts be proved under each claim to 
be the same. See Friedenthal, Kane and Miller, Civil Procedure § 14.4, at 
646 (3d ed. 1999). That treatise indicates that "a transaction or series 
of closely connected transactions is the basic unit of litigation, regardless 
of the variations in the legal theories, primary rights, grounds, evidence 
or requested remedies." Modern trends show courts applying a same-
transaction test, looking to "a natural grouping or common nucleus of 
operative facts". IcL Friedenthal notes that such a test comports with 
federal courts and in those states that have adopted comparable rules. 
Friedenthal notes that "when a single injury can be traced to 
several wrongful acts, there is still only one cause of action. This is 
similar to the rule that a change in legal theory will not justify bringing a 
new action; each ground for relief must be presented in the original 
lawsuit." If a claimant argues that there were two causes of action, they 
"must show both that the separate acts were responsible for the alleged 
injuries and that the injuries themselves are distinguishable." IcL at 652-
53. 
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Critically, Ms. Acosta claims that her back condition was asymptomatic 
prior to December 20, 1998. Thus, there was no cause of action for Ms. 
Acosta to assert - either cumulative trauma or occupational disease - until 
the occurrence of the events of December 20, 1998, events which have been 
previously litigated all the way to the Utah Supreme Court. See Weishaar 
v. Snap On Tools, 582 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 1998) (noting that subsequently 
filed application alleging distinctly different injury dates of September 1987 
and October 1988 did not constitute same claim as the April 29, 1986 
event). Like the first action, the claim arises out of the same employment 
relationship and the same employment duties — Ms. Acosta's nursing work 
at Salt Lake Regional. Like the first action, the present claim relies upon 
the same medical records and involves the same set of material facts. 
Moreover, the present claim centers upon the same evidentiary foundation, 
would require calling the same witnesses, would require similar proofs, and 
would be heard simultaneously at the same hearing with the same ALJ. 
Ms. Acosta emphasizes that because the occupational disease claim 
and the former industrial accident claim are governed by two separate 
statutes, with different reporting requirements, apportionment 
requirements, and different elements for relief, etc., they fail to meet the 
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"same claim" requirement.3 There is no doubt that one of these new claims 
(the occupational disease claim) is governed in large part by the 
Occupational Disease Act. However, the occupational disease claim, like 
the other claim, is governed by the Worker's Compensation Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-3-102 (noting workers' compensation act is incorporated 
into the occupational disease act). Moreover, these claims are governed by 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Administrative Code, and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Such is not the case as noted by Professor Larson in his well-known 
treatise where the standards of proof in these cases are entirely different. 
See Arthur Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation Law, §127.07(7] (2003) 
(I.e., legal issues in workers' compensation proceeding are distinct from 
ones brought in Title VII action for sexual harassment; standards for 
determining employee status in workers' compensation are different than 
those in tort civil suit). Both statutes, (section 34A-3-103 and section 34A-
3
 Ms. Acosta's reliance on SMP v. Kirkland. Inc.. 843 P.2d 531 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) is misplaced. In that case, the Court held that res 
judicata did not bar the second action since the Commission did not 
have jurisdiction to decide that claim - which happened to be a contract 
matter. The fact that the claims arose from different statutes with 
different requirements was not a relevant consideration in the Court's 
k
 analysis. In other words, the contract action "could not have been 
brought" in that tribunal, so res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, her 
citation to this authority is inapposite. 
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2-401) require the same basic elementary proof— that the injury or disease 
"arise out of and in the course of employment" as well as proof of medical 
and legal causation. They have the same "preponderance of evidence" 
standard. They both define employee status similarly and rely upon the 
same threshold case law (i.e., Allen v. Industrial Comm'n). Therefore, 
contrary to Ms. Acosta's assertion, the degrees of proof are not sufficiently 
different to prohibit the same claim requirement. 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 24cmt. B (1982) states on 
this point: 
Among the factors relevant to a determination whether the facts 
are so woven together as to constitute a single claim are their 
relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, 
taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes. 
Though no single factor is determinative, the relevance of trial 
convenience makes it appropriate to ask how far the witnesses 
or proofs in the second action would tend to overlap the 
witnesses or proofs relevant to the first. If there is a substantial 
overlap, the second action should ordinarily be held to [be] 
precluded. But the opposite does not hold true; even when 
there is not a substantial overlap, the second action may be 
precluded if it stems from the same transaction or series. 
Id. Utah's Tenth Circuit has adopted the Restatements "transactional" 
approach in assessing the identity of claims. See Massey, 2004 UT app 27, 
If 11 (noting Utah's federal law approach is similar to Utah state law 
approach). 
Moreover, Utah's appellate courts have noted disfavor against 
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fragmented litigation. For instance, in American Estate the Court held that 
"a claimant may not pursue a claim . . . through piecemeal litigation, 
offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve for 
future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful." American Estate 1999 
UT App 232, f 14. In Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946 (Utah 1962), the 
Supreme Court similarly held that: 
In such case the courts hold that parties should litigate their 
entire claim, demand and cause of action, and every part, issue 
and ground thereof, and if one of the parties fails to raise any 
point or issue or to litigate any part of his claim, demand or 
cause of action and the matter goes to final judgment, such 
party may not again litigate that claim, demand or cause of 
action or any issue, point or part thereof which he could have 
but failed to litigate in the former action. 
Policy would seem to indicate that when a plaintiff has once 
attempted to obtain his entire relief, based upon his entire 
claim, then the matter should be laid at rest. He should be 
denied a second attempt at substantially the same objective 
under a different guise. 
Id. at 947-48. In Wheadon, the Court held that the claimant could not 
adjudicate his right to a right-of-way under a prescriptive easement theory 
in the first action and later claim the theory of implied easement in the 
second action. 
The well-known hornbook by Friedenthal, Kane and Miller also 
subscribes to this position. It provides that res judicata is divided into two 
sections, "merger" and "bar". 
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Merger applies when a claimant has prevailed; bar applies when 
the claimant has lost. When a claimant wins a judgment, all 
possible grounds for the cause of action are said to be merged 
into the judgment and are not available for further litigation. A 
party who loses the first suit is said to be barred by the adverse 
judgment from ever raising the same cause of action again, even 
if he can present new grounds for recovery. 
Prior litigation ends litigation, no only 'as to every ground of 
recovery that was actually presented in the action, but also as 
to every ground which might have been presented.' . . . The 
preclusive breadth of the doctrine means that a judgment 
concludes the entire cause of action, which may encompass 
separate component claims. 
Friedenthal, Kane and Miller, Civil Procedure § 14.1, 14.3, at 627, 635 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
Because Ms. Acosta's later claim litigates the same subject matter as 
the first action, simply under a different theory of relief, res judicata 
applies. 
2. Ms. Acosta "Could Have" Raised the Occupational 
Disease Claim in the First Action, 
The Labor Commission was also correct in concluding that Ms. 
Acosta's subsequent claim is one that "could have" been raised in the first 
action. The Commission stated on this point: 
Commission practice and custom allow injured workers to claim 
benefits under alternative theories of accidental injury and 
occupational disease. Thus, Ms. Acosta "could have" raised her 
occupational disease [and cumulative trauma] claim in the 
earlier proceeding. 
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R. at 141. 
Section 34A-2-801 of the Utah Code provides that an employee may 
contest the compensability of an industrial accident or occupational disease 
by filing an Application for Hearing with the Division of Adjudication of the 
Utah Labor Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801. Rule 602-2-1 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act also provides: 
adjudicative proceedings for worker's compensation and 
occupational disease claims may be commenced by the injured 
worker or dependent filing a request for agency action with the 
Commission. 
Utah Admin. Proc. Act R601-2-l.A.(2002). Moreover, Rule 18 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may join "either as independent 
or as alternative claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as 
he may have against the opposing party." Utah R. Civ. P. 18. 
This is certainly not a case where Ms. Acosta was jurisdictionally 
barred from raising this additional theory in her first action, see Nebeker v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 23, nor is it a situation where her claim 
was not yet ripe for review. See Macris, 2000 UT 93, 1fl[ 24, 26 (indicating 
that one need only include claims in a suit for res judicata purposes if the 
plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the later claims were based at 
the time of the first suit was filed). Ms. Acosta had the right to raise this 
occupational disease claim, there being sufficient facts to do so, but for 
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whatever reason did not. Accordingly, the Commission was correct in 
holding that she "could have" raised this claim in her first action. 
Ms. Acosta argues that she "could not" have raised an occupational 
disease theory in her first action since Labor Commission Application for 
Hearing Form 001 in March of 1999 did not permit both industrial accident 
and occupational disease claims to be simultaneously pled. This argument 
lacks merit. 
Although Labor Commission forms have since been revised in July of 
2001 to include one Application for Hearing, Form 001, for filing both types 
of claims, at the time Ms. Acosta filed her first action there were two forms 
in existence at the Commission which allowed claims to be filed as 
occupational disease claims and/or industrial accident claims. Form 026 -
Occupational Disease Claim of Employee - was used for occupational 
disease filings. Form 001 - Application for Hearing - was used for industrial 
accident claims. Contrary to Ms. Acosta's assertion, the Commission's 
forms then and still do allow for alternative pleading. Ms. Acosta certainly 
"could have" filed her claim under either of these theories of relief. 
3. Ms. Acosta "Should Have" Raised the Occupational 
Disease Claim in the First Action. 
The Commission also correctly ruled that Ms. Acosta "should have" 
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raised this additional claim in her first action. The Commission's Order 
provides an accurate statement of Utah law on this point. It reads as 
follows: 
The Commission therefore turns to the question of 
whether she should have raised the claim in the earlier 
proceeding. 
In American Estate Management Corp v. International 
Investment and Development Corp., 986 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
App. 1999) . . . the Utah Court of Appeals has summarized the 
law in Utah and other jurisdictions on the question of whether 
a claim "should have" been raised in earlier proceedings: 
Claim preclusion reflects the expectation that parties who 
are given the capacity to present their entire controversies 
shall in fact do so. If a party fails, purposely or 
negligently, to make good his cause of action by all proper 
means within his control, he will not afterward be 
permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, 
nor to relitigate the same matters between the same 
parties. 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to pursue their claim of 
ownership through piecemeal litigation, offering one legal 
theory to the court while holding others in reserve for 
future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful. 
In this case, Ms. Acosta had the opportunity in the first 
adjudicative proceeding to present all theories she believe 
supported her claim for benefits. She is not entitled to pursue 
her claim for benefits "through piecemeal litigation, offering one 
theory to the court while holding others on reserve." 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that 
Ms. Acosta should have presented her occupational disease [and 
cumulative trauma] theory during the first adjudicative 
proceeding. The Commission further concludes that all 
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necessary elements are established for dismissal of Ms. Acosta's 
occupational disease [and cumulative trauma] claim on the 
basis of claim preclusion. 
R. at 141. 
Ms. Acosta submits that the "should have" requirement is not met 
because neither the Occupational Disease Act nor the Workers 
Compensation Act requires a claimant to bring simultaneously both an 
occupational disease and an industrial injury claim. It is certainly true that 
these statutes do not mandate a claimant to bring actions under both 
statutory theories simultaneously. Such purview is not with the legislature. 
However, Utah's Courts, interpreting the common law doctrine of res 
judicata, require parties to bring claims arising from the same controversy 
or "operative facts". Your en. 2004 UT App 33 at f 3. Thus, if the same 
controversy would implicate different theories of relief for the same subject 
matter (i.e., workers' compensation benefits), a party must raise all theories 
in the first action or thereafter be barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
This issue was discussed by the Court in American Estate Management 
which provides that when parties have the capacity to present their "entire 
controversies", they "shall in fact do so" or be barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Ms. Acosta also submits that the Commission erred in collapsing the 
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could have and should have requirements in to a single "could have 
requirement". This argument also fails. Review of the Commission's Order 
reveals that it accurately analyzed each of these requirements separately 
under the applicable law. See R. at 141. There was certainly no error by 
the Commission in this regard. 
B. Liberal Construction Rules Do Not Apply Since Ms. Acosta 
was Represented By Apt Legal Counsel In Her Prior Case 
Ms. Acosta also maintains that res judicata should not be applied in 
this case based upon the public policy of liberal construction of the workers' 
compensation statute. Appellate courts have stated that the Worker's 
Compensation Act "should be liberally construed and applied to provide 
coverage." However, the Court has also stated that liberal construction 
rules should not abrogate the applicability of a fundamental legal doctrine 
such as res judicata. More importantly, Ms. Acosta was represented by 
astute legal counsel, Timothy Allen, in her prior industrial action. This is 
certainly not a case where Ms. Acosta acted pro se and, in effect, was 
unaware of other potential legal theories of relief. Accordingly, there is 
certainly no basis of any fundamental unfairness so as to justify the 
inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata to the present case. Mr. Allen 
served as the Presiding ALJ at the Labor Commission for many years prior 
to his involvement in this case. With apportionment possible in this case 
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under an occupational disease theory (see Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-110), Mr. 
Allen could have reasonably decided to forego that particular theory for 
tactical reasons. 
The Labor Commission accurately stated that, although the 
Commission should liberally construe workers' compensation laws in favor 
of compensability, the claim preclusion doctrine serves important public 
objectives. 
Claim preclusion serves "vital public interests, including (1) 
fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing 
inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) conserving judicial 
resources. 
R. at 141-42 citing American Estate, 1999 UT App 232, %6. 
The present action is not akin to Jacobs v. Teldyne, Inc., 529 N.E. 2d 
1255 (Ohio 1998), cited by Ms. Acosta, where benefits were reopened when 
the claimant's temporary total disability conditioned materially worsened. 
Certainly, under the Commission's continuing jurisdiction, section 34A-2-
420, U.C.A., an injured worker may reopened an accepted claim under 
certain circumstances for increased disability, without res judicata 
implications. See e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 
Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 (1967). However, circumstances warranting 
reopening of Ms. Acosta's claim are not present here. Moreover, 
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Respondents respectfully submit that the Labor Commission itself should 
be given some deference in deciding how liberally it may construe the 
Workers7 Compensation Act of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Claim preclusion is premised on the principle that a controversy 
should be adjudicated only once. Indeed, Courts have routinely held that 
this doctrine is based upon the principle that the proper administration of 
justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or 
cause. The Commission correctly ruled that Ms. Acosta's subsequent 
action is barred under the claim preclusion doctrine of res judicata. Ms. 
Acosta had full opportunity to raise this alternative theory in her former 
action, and she was represented by legal counsel who had served for many 
years as the Presiding Administrative Law Judge for the Labor Commission. 
Under these circumstances, affirmation of the Labor Commission's Order 
is appropriate. 
DATED this _Z_ day of March, 2004. 
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Mutual Ins. Co. 
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